| Description: | When using the Apache JServ Protocol (AJP), care must be taken when
trusting incoming connections to Apache Tomcat. Tomcat treats AJP
connections as having higher trust than, for example, a similar HTTP
connection. If such connections are available to an attacker, they can
be exploited in ways that may be surprising. In Apache Tomcat 9.0.0.M1
to 9.0.0.30, 8.5.0 to 8.5.50 and 7.0.0 to 7.0.99, Tomcat shipped with
an AJP Connector enabled by default that listened on all configured IP
addresses. It was expected (and recommended in the security guide)
that this Connector would be disabled if not required. This
vulnerability report identified a mechanism that allowed: - returning
arbitrary files from anywhere in the web application - processing any
file in the web application as a JSP Further, if the web application
allowed file upload and stored those files within the web application
(or the attacker was able to control the content of the web
application by some other means) then this, along with the ability to
process a file as a JSP, made remote code execution possible. It is
important to note that mitigation is only required if an AJP port is
accessible to untrusted users. Users wishing to take a defence-in-
depth approach and block the vector that permits returning arbitrary
files and execution as JSP may upgrade to Apache Tomcat 9.0.31, 8.5.51
or 7.0.100 or later. A number of changes were made to the default AJP
Connector configuration in 9.0.31 to harden the default configuration.
It is likely that users upgrading to 9.0.31, 8.5.51 or 7.0.100 or
later will need to make small changes to their configurations.
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